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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees persons charged
with crimes the right to effective assistance of counsel.1 This guarantee
ensures fairness in the critical stages of a criminal case, when “defendants
cannot be presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”2
One such critical stage arises when the defendant pleads guilty to the
charge, or some lesser-included charge, before the court.3 Until recently,
courts generally held counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty to advise the
defendant at this stage extended only to advice regarding the guilty plea’s

* Judge, 130th District Court of Texas. B.S. and M.Agr., Texas A&M University.
J.D., South Texas College of Law.
1. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
2. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (“The Sixth Amendment
requires effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding . . . [this]
applies to pretrial critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding
. . . .”).
3. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (holding the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches at a preliminary hearing where the defendant enters a guilty plea). The
Supreme Court recently acknowledged ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state court convictions result from guilty pleas. Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.22.2009 (2009)).
Most guilty pleas are entered following a plea bargain. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2470–86 (2004)
(discussing the pressures and incentives presented to prosecutors and defendants that
motivate plea bargaining). Plea bargains are agreements between the defendant and the
prosecutor whereby each side obtains concessions in exchange for certainty, risk
avoidance, and closure. Id. (discussing plea bargaining’s purpose and the perspectives of
both the defense and prosecution on plea bargaining).
607
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direct consequences.4 This changed in 2010 when the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.5
The case came before the Supreme Court because Jose Padilla, a lawful
permanent resident, sought post-conviction review of a plea-bargained
felony conviction6 that triggered removal proceedings.7 Padilla asked the
Supreme Court to set aside his conviction because his attorney failed to
give him correct advice regarding his guilty plea’s immigration
consequences.8 In order to prevail on this Sixth Amendment claim,
Padilla had to show deficiency in his trial counsel’s performance and that
the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.9

4. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1109 (2013) (observing prior
to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), federal courts “almost
unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform
their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences, including deportation”); see, e.g.,
United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We hold that an attorney’s failure
to advise a client that deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
5. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (2010).
6. In immigration law, the term “conviction” is a term of art with broader meaning
than in the state criminal law world.
(A) The term ‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt
of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and
(ii) [t]he judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the
alien’s liberty to be imposed.
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense
is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of
law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment
or sentence in whole or in part.
INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). Since probation counts as a restraint on liberty,
suspended sentences and deferred adjudications are considered “convictions” for immigration law purposes. See, e.g., Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517, 524–26 (11th Cir. 2013)
(holding a “confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’” under immigration
law, even where adjudication is deferred).
7. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1475 (2010).
8. Id. at. __, 130 S. Ct. at 1475 (2010).
9. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (2010) (applying Strickland’s two-prong test, which
requires showing counsel’s representation was deficient and prejudiced defendant);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (reversing a conviction based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to first “show that counsel’s
performance was deficient” and second, show the “deficient performance prejudiced the
defense”); see Justin F. Marceau, Remedying Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, 45 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 277, 280 (2012) (“Under the Strickland test, a defendant alleging that his right to
counsel was violated through the ineffective assistance of his attorney bears the burden of
proving that his lawyer’s performance was below the ‘prevailing professional norms,’ and
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In finding Padilla’s attorney was deficient under these circumstances,
the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant’s
attorney to provide specific advice about the deportation risk resulting
from a guilty plea.10 Specifically, the Supreme Court held criminal
defense attorneys representing noncitizens have an affirmative duty to
correctly advise the client about the specific immigration consequences of
the plea when those consequences are “succinct, clear, and explicit.”11
When those consequences are not so clear, an attorney “need do no more
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a
risk of adverse consequences.”12 Padilla has been described as a
“watershed”13 case with a “seismic”14 effect on how criminal law is
practiced.15
While much has been written about Padilla, its impact, and its possible
reach, there has been little written about how trial courts should address
the challenges Padilla’s holding imposes. Trial courts have a duty to
ensure guilty pleas are entered voluntarily and intelligently. Padilla
suggests when a noncitizen makes a plea agreement and wishes to enter a
plea, there are more significant consequences that may not be evident at
first glance. Trial courts should examine noncitizen guilty pleas with care
to ensure the plea is given voluntarily and intelligently and will withstand
post-conviction scrutiny on any immigration issue.
This Article addresses how Padilla v. Kentucky affects best practices
for courts and defense attorneys at the plea bargain stage. This Article
suggests courts take affirmative steps prior to accepting a noncitizen’s

he must demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”).
10. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (2010).
11. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (2010); see also Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea
Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2657 (2013) (stating Padilla holds “criminal
defense attorneys have an affirmative constitutional duty to properly advise clients about
the near-automatic deportation consequences of a guilty plea”).
12. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (2010).
13. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118, 1120–21 (2011) (discussing the impact
of Padilla on plea bargaining).
14. McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 798
(2011) (identifying Padilla as a “seismic event” and the ways attorneys can advise their
clients on the range of potential penalties that may be imposed as a result of their criminal
conduct).
15. The Supreme Court found Padilla’s trial counsel was deficient when he gave his
client incorrect advice regarding immigration consequences. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S.
Ct. at 1475 (2010). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Kentucky courts for
further proceedings to determine whether the ineffective counsel prejudiced Padilla’s trial.
Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476 (2010).
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guilty plea to reveal whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
relevant immigration advice has been afforded. Further, courts should
develop a record of the plea proceedings that demonstrates trial counsel
has fully informed the defendant about the immigration consequences
and from which post-conviction review may proceed to resolution.
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first part addresses Padilla’s
factual background and holding to identify defense counsel’s duty to
provide immigration advice to the noncitizen client. The second part
discusses the plea bargain in modern criminal jurisprudence and reviews
how courts establish that a guilty plea is offered voluntarily and
intelligently through the plea colloquy. In Part III, the Article analyzes
Strickland v. Washington’s two-prong test to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel as applied in immigration consequences claims. This
framework will inform the steps trial courts can take to ensure a
noncitizen’s guilty plea satisfies constitutional mandates. In Part IV, the
Article closes by suggesting best practices for courts and counsel to
safeguard a noncitizen’s constitutional rights while developing a record
that can respond to any post-conviction challenge on Sixth Amendment
grounds.
I. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Prior to his arrest for drug-related charges in Hardin County, Kentucky,16 Jose Padilla had been a lawful resident in the United States for
over forty years.17 Padilla’s drug crime, like “virtually every” drug offense under federal immigration law, was a deportable offense.18 Padilla’s attorney conveyed a plea offer that required Padilla to plead guilty
to the drug offenses, in exchange for a partially probated sentence and
dismissal of the non-drug charges.19 Because of his many years of residency in the United States, Padilla’s attorney assured him he would incur
no immigration consequences as a result of his guilty plea.20 Padilla
agreed to the plea bargain and the trial court accepted his plea.
Later, citing Padilla’s drug-related conviction, the government initiated
deportation proceedings against him.21 Padilla filed for post-conviction
relief on grounds that his trial counsel failed to advise him about the im-

16. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d Padilla, 559 U.S.
at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
17. Id. at 483. The Commonwealth of Kentucky charged Padilla with “trafficking in
more than five pounds of marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number.” Id.
18. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1 (2010).
19. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
20. Id.
21. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1475 (2010).
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migration-related consequences of his plea.22 Padilla based his claim for
relief from the conviction on the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.23 The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to counsel,24 a right that extends to the plea bargaining
process.25 A defendant challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must show his attorney’s representation was deficient
and the deficiency prejudiced the defense to obtain relief.26
In state court, Padilla’s case turned on the collateral nature of the attorney’s allegedly deficient advice.27 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
held collateral matters such as immigration consequences lay outside the
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel guarantee and denied Padilla’s request for relief.28 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.29 The
question presented was whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s attorney had a duty to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading
guilty would subject him to automatic deportation under federal immigration law.30 The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative
and remanded the case for further proceedings as to whether the ineffective counsel prejudiced Padilla’s case and to determine his potential
remedy.31
Prior to Padilla, state and federal courts “almost unanimously” held a
criminal conviction’s collateral consequences, such as deportation, lie
outside the Sixth Amendment’s ambit.32 In granting Padilla relief, the
Supreme Court did not rely upon the problematic distinction between a

22. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1475 (2010).
23. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (2010).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding the appointment of counsel is a fundamental right
and essential to a fair trial).
25. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding the “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”).
26. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
27. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483–84 (Ky. 2008), rev’d Padilla,
559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (discussing the trial court’s holding which did not require
the defendant be informed of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, which held that
counsel not advising on collateral consequences, such as deportation, may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
28. Id. at 485 (reversing the Kentucky Court of Appeals and reinstating the final judgment of the trial court).
29. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (2010).
30. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1475 (2010).
31. Id. at. __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477, 1487 (2010).
32. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1109 (2013).
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conviction’s direct and collateral consequences,33 but relied instead upon
the “unique nature of deportation” and its close connection to criminal
proceedings and the recent changes to immigration law making removal a
nearly automatic punishment for noncitizen offenders.34 While Padilla’s
implications for the collateral consequences of other criminal convictions
are not yet clearly established,35 Padilla unequivocally provides guidance
regarding the constitutionally mandated advice and counsel attorneys
must provide regarding immigration consequences.
To make these distinctions, the Supreme Court detailed the developments in immigration law over the years that have “dramatically raised
the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”36 Justice Stevens observed, since the early nineteenth century, federal law has enmeshed deportation and criminal convictions, with current immigration law making
removal from the country an automatic consequence for many crimes.37
Because immigration and criminal law are so intermingled, the Supreme
Court concluded immigration consequences are “uniquely difficult to
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”38 However, because a criminal conviction’s immigration consequences have become increasingly severe, the Supreme Court found accurate advice on the
subject has gained critical importance for defendants.39
Whether an attorney’s representation was constitutionally effective depends upon whether that representation meets objective standards of reasonableness after considering the prevailing professional standards.40

33. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1481, n.8 (2010) (noting “there is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences” but that it “has no bearing on the disposition of this case . . . ”).
34. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (2010).
35. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (2010) (Alito J., concurring) (mentioning collateral
consequences such as “civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge
from the Armed Forces, and loss of business and professional licenses” are not matters that
have yet been extended to the criminal defense attorney’s duties under the Sixth
Amendment).
36. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476 (2010) (listing the expansion of the class of deportable
offenses and the limitation of the judge’s discretionary authority as changes that have
“raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction”).
37. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1479–81 (2010) (stating contemporary law is more harsh
because it has significantly limited the Attorney General’s use of discretion to provide
relief from deportation).
38. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (2010).
39. Id. at. __, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (2010).
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (stating “[p]revailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides”
for determining whether an attorney’s performance was reasonable for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss3/4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2498701

6

Estlinbaum: Effective Plea Bargaining for Noncitizens

2014]

NONCITIZEN PLEA BARGAINS

613

The Supreme Court found a broad range of authorities that strongly
urged defense counsel to advise noncitizen clients “as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated
plea.”41 The Supreme Court also recognized “preserving the client’s right
to remain in the United States” may be more important to the client than
any potential jail sentence.42 Requiring, as a matter of constitutional law,
defense counsel give sound advice about a guilty plea’s immigration consequences affirms the defendant’s choice principle by giving the defendant the best opportunity to make a truly voluntary and intelligent choice
about his case’s disposition.
Immigration law is a fluid and highly complex legal specialty and, in
many cases, a conviction’s immigration consequences will not be clear.
However, in other cases, the immigration consequences are very clear.
This was the case for Jose Padilla because immigration law mandates removal for virtually every drug crime.43 The Supreme Court determined
Padilla’s attorney could have easily realized a guilty plea made Padilla
eligible for deportation simply by reading the statute.44 This statute expressly mandates removal from the country for all controlled substances
convictions, except for the most minor marijuana possession offenses.45
Counsels’ specific duty to their noncitizen clients after Padilla depends,
then, upon whether the convictions’ immigration consequences are clear
or uncertain. The Sixth Amendment provides, when the immigration
consequences are “truly clear,” counsel has an equally clear duty to provide correct advice to the noncitizen defendant.46 However, when the
immigration consequences are unclear, counsel’s duty extends to merely

41. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(f) (1999), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_
standards_guiltypleas_blk.html#3.2. See also Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1482
(2010) (noting advising clients of deportation consequences has become the prevailing
norm for defending noncitizen clients).
42. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476 (2010) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S.
289, 323 (2001)).
43. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (2010) (“[A]gree[ing] . . . that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made
him subject to automatic deportation.”).
44. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (2010).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“Any alien who at any time after admission
has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or
less of marijuana, is deportable.”).
46. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (2010).
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advising the noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may include
future adverse immigration consequences.47
In Padilla’s case, the Supreme Court determined counsel was deficient
because he gave Padilla incorrect advice about the plea and conviction’s
immigration consequences when those consequences were “truly clear.”48
The Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision denying relief and remanded the case to determine whether the attorney’s
misinformation caused Padilla prejudice, a matter not addressed by the
lower courts.49 To prevail on remand, Padilla had to show the decision to
reject the plea and proceed toward trial would have been “rational under
the circumstances” had he been correctly advised about the immigration
consequences.50
II. PLEA REQUIREMENTS: VOLUNTARILY

AND

INTELLIGENTLY

While Jose Padilla’s journey through the criminal court system produced a landmark Sixth Amendment holding, by another important measure, the case was quite unremarkable. Padilla, like the overwhelming
majority of persons convicted in the state and federal systems, pled guilty
to his crime after reaching a plea bargain with the state.51 An examination of these figures led Justice Kennedy to recently state the criminal
justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”52 Plea bargains in criminal cases are similar to settlements in civil
cases.53 A plea bargain occurs when the defendant pleads guilty, giving
up important rights and the chance for acquittal, and in exchange the
government surrenders the right to more fully charge or punish the de47. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (2010); see also César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández,
Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 851, 854
(2013) (arguing application of the Strickland test in Padilla “threatens to erode the baseline Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel”).
48. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (2010).
49. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (2010).
50. Id.. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (2010).
51. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (2010) (“Pleas account for nearly [ninety-five percent]
of all criminal convictions.”). According to the Department of Justice, over ninety-seven
percent of dispositions in the felony courts were by guilty plea or nolo contendre in 2010.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 10 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/re
ports/asr2010/10statrpt.pdf; see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
(2012) (stating ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state
convictions result from guilty pleas).
52. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
53. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a plea bargain
as an agreement whereby a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a more lenient sentence or dismissal of other charges), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining a settlement as an agreement to end a lawsuit).
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fendant.54 For defendants, plea bargains are exercises in risk avoidance.55
For the prosecution, a plea bargain preserves resources and provides
certainty.56
Early common law courts were hesitant to accept guilty pleas, with
courts urging a confessing defendant to retract the plea because most felony crimes were mandatorily punishable by death.57 Over time, even as a
greater number of felony crimes became punishable by means other than
death—either due to judicial mercy or relaxed penalties—courts continued to be reluctant in accepting guilty pleas, especially when accompanied by any offer of favor.58 As the number of criminal laws—and
criminal cases—grew in the early twentieth century, courts became less
wary of guilty pleas as a matter of administrative necessity, because the
rapid developments in criminal law outpaced the growth in courts and
prosecutorial staff.59
To accommodate the rise in bargained-for guilty pleas, the Supreme
Court established a constitutional standard requiring pleas be entered
voluntarily and intelligently.60 The Supreme Court also held the trial
judge accepting the plea should establish a record “adequate for any re-

54. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009); see also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (endorsing plea bargains as a means to resolve criminal cases
provided the defendant’s plea is made voluntarily and intelligently); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) (describing more fully
the concessions and benefits typically present in plea bargain cases).
55. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; Easterbrook, supra note 54.
56. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; Easterbrook, supra note 54.
57. Barry J. Fisher, Judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy? A Capital Defendant’s Right to Plead Guilty, 65 ALB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (2001).
58. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM L. REV. 1,
12–13 (1979) (offering a historical perspective on guilty pleas and plea bargaining).
59. See, e.g., Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 36 n.14, 38 (2002) (discussing the dominance of guilty pleas in criminal practice in the twentieth century and the perception that “plea bargaining makes the
prosecutor more administratively efficient”); see also Ellen S. Thomas, Plea Bargaining:
The Clash Between Theory and Practice, 20 LOY. L. REV. 303, 312 (1974) (stating the plea
bargaining system was originally built “to make practical our cherished notions of justice[,]” and arguing the system is no longer meeting those goals, but rather continues to
exist merely “for the maintenance of the system itself . . . ”). The Supreme Court has also
noted the administrative benefits presented by allowing plea bargaining to occur. United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002) (noting “resource-saving advantages” of the plea
bargaining process); Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (approving plea bargaining as an avenue to
preserve “scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources”).
60. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”).
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view that may be later sought” and sufficient to withstand “collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.”61
A judge accepting a guilty plea plays no role in the plea bargain process,62 other than to ensure a guilty plea made by plea bargain once
reached is made voluntarily and intelligently. Because courts do not participate in the plea bargain negotiations, but must formally approve the
bargain reached, plea bargains are thought of as two-part contracts. As
the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v. Kraus:63
Excluding the judge from the plea discussions thus serves three purposes: it minimizes the risk that the defendant will be judicially coerced
into pleading guilty, it preserves the impartiality of the court, and it
avoids any appearance of impropriety. Of course, once the parties have
themselves negotiated a plea agreement and presented that agreement to
the court for approval, it is not only permitted but expected that the court
will take an active role in evaluating the agreement. . . . Preeminently,
the court must make sure that the defendant’s plea is both voluntary and
knowing. . . . Indeed, it is exactly because the court plays such a vital role
in assessing the validity of the plea that it must remain removed from the
discussions culminating in that plea, lest its objectivity and impartiality be
compromised.64
Courts may accept or reject a plea bargains for many reasons. The
Constitution, however, requires a court to confirm the defendant makes
his plea voluntarily and intelligently as a condition before accepting the
plea.65 These requirements guarantee informed choice.66 Padilla affirms
the choice principle by placing the duty upon the noncitizen defendant’s

61. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (stating “the court must not participate in [the plea
agreement] discussions”). Many states require this same prohibition. See, e.g., Wilson v.
State, 845 So. 2d 142, 156–57 (Fla. 2003) (“It is not the judge’s role to advocate for a plea
offer. When the trial judge becomes an advocate for a plea-either one offered by the judge
or by the State-the trial judge runs the risk of departing from its critical role as a neutral
arbiter.”); People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Mich. 1982) (“A trial judge shall not
initiate or participate in discussions aimed at reaching a plea agreement. He may not engage in the negotiation of the bargain itself. The trial judge’s role in the plea-bargaining
procedure shall remain that of a detached and neutral judicial official.”); State v. Warren,
558 A.2d 1312, 1320 (N.J. 1989) (“Courts . . . cannot become involved in the negotiation of
guilty pleas. . . . Strict limitations on judicial participation in plea negotiations relate to the
concern that judicial neutrality and objectivity must be preserved.”); Moore v. State, 295
S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The only proper role of the trial court in the
plea-bargain process is advising the defendant whether it will ‘follow or reject’ the bargain
between the state and the defendant.”).
63. United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1998).
64. Id. at 452–53 (citations omitted).
65. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
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attorney to inform the client about a criminal conviction’s immigration
consequences.67
In the 2011–2012 Term, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal defendant’s informed, voluntary choice in two more cases relating to ineffective assistance during plea bargaining. In Lafler v. Cooper,68 the
Supreme Court found defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient
representation when he misinformed Cooper as to a relevant and material legal issue, leading Cooper to reject a plea bargaining opportunity he
otherwise would have accepted.69 Rather than accepting a plea deal,
Cooper’s case went to a jury trial where the jury convicted Cooper of the
offense.70 Cooper received a sentence significantly greater than the one
he rejected.71 The State argued any deficiency in the attorney’s representation was cured when Cooper subsequently received a fair trial.72 The
Supreme Court rejected this point and found the constitutional harm occurred when Cooper lost the benefits he might have received through
informed choice in the plea bargaining process.73
Missouri v. Frye,74 also decided during the 2011–2012 term, involved
similar informed choice concerns. In Frye, the defendant’s counsel was
deficient for failing to convey to the client a favorable written plea offer
extended by the prosecutor.75 This offer, among other things, reduced
Frye’s charge from a felony to a misdemeanor.76 The plea offer expired
and Frye later pled guilty on an open plea to the felony.77 The judge
sentenced Frye to a three-year prison term—substantially more than the
ninety-day sentence recommended in the original plea offer.78 The court
found counsel’s performance to be deficient because under prevailing
norms, attorneys have a duty to communicate formal plea offers from the
prosecution to the client.79 By failing to communicate the plea offer to

66. Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1139, 1150
(2013) (exploring the “jurisprudential rift between the meaning of effective assistance of
counsel at bargain and trial”).
67. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483, 1486 (2010).
68. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
69. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (2012).
70. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1386 (2012).
71. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1386 (2012) (noting respondent received a sentence three
and a half times more severe than he would have likely received from pleading guilty).
72. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (2012).
73. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (2012).
74. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
75. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (2012).
76. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (2012).
77. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (2012).
78. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1404–05 (2012).
79. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (2012).
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the defendant, counsel deprived his client of the opportunity to make an
informed choice.80
While counsel has the duty to advise the client about the relative merits
of a plea,81 the decision to plead guilty or stand trial rests solely with the
defendant.82 When the defendant chooses to enter a plea, courts have an
obligation to ensure the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently before
accepting it.83 Padilla, Lafler, and Frye all provide an attorney’s performance is constitutionally deficient when the attorney fails to inform (or
misinforms) the defendant about relevant and material matters closely
connected to the plea process.84
Courts determine a plea is made voluntarily and intelligently by questioning the defendant prior to accepting a plea in what is known as the
plea colloquy.85 The colloquy provides courts an opportunity to determine if the defendant knows the charge, the range of punishment, the
plea bargain’s terms, and the extent to which the defendant has rights
related to a defense, such as the right to remain silent.86 These inquiries
and interchanges allow judges to determine the defendant’s competency

80. Frye, 566 U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (holding “‘counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness[,]’” making it deficient).
81. See Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding effective assistance of counsel includes counsel’s informed opinion regarding what pleas should be entered). Counsel is not required to “investigate all the facts of the case, explore all possible
avenues of defense, etc.” Id.
82. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (stating “the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal”) (emphasis
added); see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to
Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2006) (“The defendant decides whether to
plead guilty or go to trial . . . .”). The American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal
Justice, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and Model Code of Professional Responsibility also provide that the ultimate decision to plead guilty rests with the defendant.
Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: Self-Inflicted Injustice of Lawyer-Inflicted
Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39, 67 (2004).
83. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing,
97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012) (stating the requirement a guilty plea be made voluntarily and
intelligently protects individual autonomy); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1913 (1992) (discussing autonomy considerations
that justify plea bargaining).
84. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1376, 1387, 1391 (2012); Missouri v.
Frye, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1401–03 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky 559 U.S. __, 130 S.
Ct. 1473, 1475–77 (2010); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 83, at 1951, 1957–59 (concluding the Supreme Court declined to define the outer limits of the Sixth Amendment’s reach,
settling instead for a case-by-case review of the attorney’s actions).
85. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999) (“The purpose of a plea
colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or involuntary plea.”).
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). The federal government and many states have rules that
mandate the admonishments a court must give to a defendant before accepting a plea. See
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and to confirm the defendant is entering his guilty plea voluntarily and
intelligently.87
Supreme Court precedent mandates the plea colloquy.88 In Boykin v.
Alabama89 the Supreme Court considered the case of a defendant sentenced to death following a guilty plea.90 The record of the proceeding
revealed, “[T]he judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his
plea, and [the] petitioner did not address the court.”91 The Supreme
Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision stating: “It was
error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent
and voluntary.”92 Boykin cautions trial judges that due process requires
sufficient evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision to accept the plea
and that such evidence must appear in the record of the proceeding.93
Sufficient evidence necessarily includes evidence demonstrating the defendant offered his plea voluntarily and intelligently.
Courts are given wide latitude to question defendants in their effort to
determine whether the plea meets constitutional guidelines. Courts may
fully question the defendant’s knowledge about the specific plea agreement’s relevant consequences and the constitutional rights waived to
court’s satisfaction.94 A careful and thorough plea colloquy reduces the
risk that the defendant’s plea is not truly voluntarily or intelligently made
and establishes a record for more accurate fact finding on post-conviction
review.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF

COUNSEL: TWO-PRONGED TEST

Defendants seeking relief from criminal conviction on ineffective assistance grounds must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (listing the mandatory admonishments in federal courts); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.13(a) (listing the required admonishments in Texas).
87. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1978) (“It is the judge, not counsel,
who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial.”).
88. See generally Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J.
944, 987–88 (2012) (discussing the implications and limitations of the plea colloquy).
89. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
90. Id. at 238.
91. Id. at 239.
92. Id. at 242.
93. Id. at 243 (“We cannot presume a waiver . . . from a silent record.”); see Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970) (“The new element added in Boykin was the
requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded
guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.”).
94. Poulin, supra note 82, at 1272.
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Washington.95 This test applies when the defendant alleges counsel was
ineffective during the plea bargaining process.96 Strickland holds that defendants cannot prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless they prove defective performance by the attorney and a legally
cognizable, prejudicial effect on the relevant outcome.97
A. Defective Performance
The Supreme Court has rejected bright-line rules for determining
whether an attorney’s representation was effective; instead, claims are examined on a case-by-case basis.98 As a result, post-conviction review of
counsel’s performance is often a fact-intensive affair. In cases relating to
ineffective assistance claims at plea bargaining, this post hoc review is
made more difficult by the fact that the relevant information lies outside
the record. Communication between a defendant and his attorney is
privileged, and this privilege extends to the attorney’s advice about immigration consequences.99 Plea negotiations and attorney-client confer-

95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
96. Id. at 669.
97. Id.; see Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
229, 232 (2012) (describing Strickland’s requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel
in terms of attorney competence and error resulting from incompetence, which affects a
case’s outcome); Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 699
(2011) (stating Strickland requires defendants asserting an ineffective assistance claim to
show “(1) attorney error; and (2) prejudice flowing from that error”); Stephen F. Smith,
Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) (noting “the Strickland standard” is in reality a “two-pronged, performance-and-prejudice test . . . ”).
98. Moreover:
“As we have previously noted, ‘[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel.’ Rather, courts must ‘judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,’ . . .
and ‘[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential[.]’”
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–90); see
also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 711 (2002) (asserting Strickland
requires a case-by-case analysis of counsel’s effectiveness); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia
Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just a Nominal Right?, 12 NAT’L L.J. 42, 42 (1990) (stating
Strickland provides “no specific guidelines for measuring a lawyer’s performance . . . ”).
99. Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice
for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 21 (2012) (noting the privileged nature of communication regarding immigration matters between a noncitizen defendant and the defense attorney).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss3/4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2498701

14

Estlinbaum: Effective Plea Bargaining for Noncitizens

2014]

NONCITIZEN PLEA BARGAINS

621

ences about a plea’s merits virtually never occur in open court on the
record.100
The Padilla Court rejected the argument that an attorney’s or court’s
generic warnings stating a conviction may have immigration consequences are adequate under the Sixth Amendment when the immigration
consequences are “truly clear.”101 A few courts have held a court’s general warnings may cure deficient performance by the attorney on this subject, and these cases turn on the evidence in the record that the defendant
knew the plea’s consequences despite the poor advice.102
B. Prejudicial Effect
Strickland’s prejudice prong requires establishing, by a reasonable
probability, but for the unprofessional errors, the relevant result would
have been different.103 The relevant result includes broader procedural
and substantive considerations than the ultimate question of guilt.104 For
example, in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court confronted a situation in which the defendant attorney failed to file a notice of appeal on
his client’s behalf.105 After addressing the performance prong, the Supreme Court held prejudice is established in this instance where the defendant proves but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would have
appealed, not whether that appeal would have been successful.106
Rompilla v. Beard107 presented a death penalty case in which the defendant claimed his attorneys were ineffective when they failed to investigate potential mitigation evidence contained in his prison and school
files.108 The Supreme Court found the attorneys’ performance deficient
100. The Supreme Court has identified the importance the colloquy record plays in
resolving post-conviction challenges on grounds the defendant’s plea was not voluntarily or
intelligently given. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999) (outlining
the purpose of the plea colloquy); Lang, supra note 88, at 947 (underscoring the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on the plea colloquy’s role at trial).
101. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010) (“When the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was [in Padilla], the duty to give correct advice is
equally clear.”).
102. State v. Martinez, 729 S.E.2d 390, 392 (Ga. 2012) (holding a trial court’s plea
colloquy warnings of adverse immigration consequences precludes a finding of Strickland
prejudice in cases in which the defendant acknowledges the conviction will lead to “certain
or almost certain” deportation, regardless of counsel’s poor advice).
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
104. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“It is insufficient
simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in
the pretrial process.”).
105. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 470 (2000).
106. Id. at 484.
107. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 382 (2005).
108. Id.
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and examined whether prejudice resulted.109 The Supreme Court held
the defendant was prejudiced because the jury reviewing the evidence
could have decided his sentence in the punishment phase differently.110
The Supreme Court concluded prejudice occurred because “the undiscovered ‘mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced
the jury’s appraisal of [Rompilla’s] culpability,’ and the likelihood of a
different result if the evidence had gone in is ‘sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome’ actually reached at sentencing[.]”111
These cases show the relevant Strickland prejudice required depends
upon the stage of the criminal case proceedings. The prejudicial effect
requirement focuses upon the harm connected to the attorney’s deficient
performance. When a defendant seeks to show that his attorney provided
deficient advice leading to a plea producing adverse immigration consequences, Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a showing that the defendant’s decision to reject the plea bargain offer would have been rational
under the circumstances.112 This prong is guided not by whether the defendant would have been acquitted at a full trial, but instead turns on
whether the defendant, had he known the true immigration consequences, would have rejected the plea offer and either continued to negotiate or gone to trial.113
When the plea colloquy is perfunctory, the Strickland prejudice analysis is necessarily post hoc in nature. A defendant’s subjective, self-serving
statement stating he or she would not have pled guilty had counsel’s representation not been deficient is typically not sufficient to establish
prejudice.114 Courts require the defendant produce objective evidence
that a decision to reject the plea offer would have been rational. However, a Padilla-specific plea colloquy can help avoid the post hoc fact finding the plea colloquy is designed to prevent.

109. Id. at 390.
110. Id. at 390, 393 (conceding the jury could have heard all the mitigating evidence
and may have likely decided a different sentence).
111. Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
112. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
113. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (“The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).
114. Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding prejudice is not
established by defendant’s self-serving statement that he would have accepted the plea had
his attorney performance not been deficient, but rather requires the defendant to identify
“objective evidence in support of his claim of prejudice”); People v. Hale, No. 113140, 2013
WL 5488909, at *614 (Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (stating a defendant must include more than their
own “‘subjective, self-serving’ testimony” to show prejudice under the Strickland test).
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In Ex parte Murillo,115 a Texas appellate court identified four objective
factors that could show prejudice when an attorney fails to properly advise a client about the guilty plea’s immigration consequences. These factors are: (1) the evidence of defendant’s guilt, (2) the defendant’s factual
or legal defenses, (3) whether immigration status was a primary concern,
and (4) the plea deal received compared to risks at trial.116 Applying
these factors in Murillo, the appellate court found there was strong evidence of guilt and the defendant identified no factual or legal defenses to
the crime.117 Murillo’s evidence also failed to show he expressed a desire
to remain in the country before accepting the plea bargain.118 The appellate court determined Murillo’s choice was either to accept a thirty-day
sentence by plea bargain and face presumptive deportation, or go to trial
in a case with a significant likelihood of guilt facing the same presumptive
deportation and a harsher punishment of up to a year in jail.119 Murillo’s
decision to reject the plea bargain would not have been rational under
the circumstances had he known the true immigration consequences.120
A plea colloquy inquiring into whether non-citizen defendants have received guidance pertaining to immigration status not only allows the trial
courts to ensure the plea is offered voluntarily and intelligently, but can
also insulate the resulting conviction from attack.121 In the next section,
the Article concludes by considering relevant questions trial courts might
consider asking the noncitizen defendant and counsel before accepting a
guilty plea.

115. Ex parte Murillo, 389 S.W.3d. 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14thDist.] 2013).
116. Id. at 928–30.
117. Id. at 931.
118. Id. at 932.
119. Id. at 931.
120. Id. at 931–32.
121. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 n.7 (1969) (“‘A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated
from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the
defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant
understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences.’”) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Purdue., 237 A.2d 196, 197–98 (Pa. 1968); see also
Burdick v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 2007) (suggesting a judge who discharges the function of guaranteeing the plea is voluntarily and intelligently also leaves a
record adequate for post-conviction review); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489,
512–13 (Pa. 2004) (stating a colloquy that shows “the defendant understands the nature of
the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which
he is charged and the permissible range of sentences[,] . . . serves the additional purpose of
creating a complete record at the time the plea is entered, upon which a reviewing court
may determine whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily”).
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Courts have an independent duty to ensure a guilty plea is made voluntarily and intelligently before accepting that plea.122 This duty protects
the defendant’s broad array of rights, including the right to jury trial, the
right to remain silent, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Courts typically engage in a plea colloquy
with the defendant to establish facts in the record that confirm the plea is
entered voluntarily and intelligently.123
Padilla holds an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon immigration advice will be reviewed under Strickland v. Washington’s twopart test.124 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, defendants
must show “counsel’s performance was deficient and . . . the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.”125
As Boykin and its progeny suggest, a well-considered plea colloquy
serves not only to ensure the plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently,
but also to make a record that will answer a post-conviction attack on the
resulting conviction.126 Colloquy questions addressing immigration consequences follow two lines of questioning. The first, relating to effective
performance, is whether the defendant has been advised or is aware of
the immigration consequences of the plea. The second, relating to
prejudice, identifies whether the defendant is particularly likely to show
harm in the event the advice he received is incorrect.
Strickland’s first prong requires defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show counsel’s performance was deficient.127 In the
Padilla context, this means counsel failed to give relevant advice regard-

122. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”).
123. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999) (“The purpose of a plea
colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or involuntary plea.”).
124. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1476 (2010).
125. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984); see also Smith, supra note 97,
at 523–25, 543 (arguing Strickland adopted lax performance standards and its definition of
prejudice treats juries “as simple fact finders who balance aggravating and mitigating factors instead of making the distinctly moral judgment of whether the defendant should receive mercy despite the severity of his crime[,]” but ultimately finding federal and state
courts have reinvigorated the Strickland standard and ineffectiveness claims are being
taken more seriously).
126. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969); see also Anne R. Traum, Mass
Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 439 n.116 (2013) (“Plea agreement procedures are intended to withstand appellate review and preclude collateral review.”).
127. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669.
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ing the plea’s immigration consequences to the defendant.128 Padilla tells
us the relevant advice is dependent upon the defendant’s particular circumstances.129 In this important aspect, the advice required by Padilla
for noncitizens is different in character than the general advice required
regarding the right to remain silent, the right to a jury trial, and the right
to confront witnesses. These latter rights are the same and the advice is
the same from defendant to defendant.
However, advice relating to immigration consequences is specific to the
defendant and his or her particular circumstances.130 In this regard, the
advice the attorney is required to provide is fluid, much like the advice
relating to the range of punishment.131 Like immigration consequences,
the range of potential punishment varies from offense to offense132 and
from defendant to defendant.133 The best practice for both cases is to
confirm the defendants have been given advice relevant to their circumstances and that they understand the advice.
Some have suggested state courts in particular lack the institutional immigration law competence to reliably determine whether a particular
state law conviction will clearly result in deportation.134 This institutional
incompetence, if it exists, would be a more critical concern if the trial
court were assigned the primary duty to provide the defendant the relevant advice regarding the plea’s immigration consequences. This, however, is not the case. The defense attorney owes this duty to the client
and it is not at all certain—and in many instances may be doubtful—
whether a trial court’s generic admonishment about potential immigration consequences will be an adequate substitute for the defense attorney’s counsel, at least where the immigration consequences are “truly

128. Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1476 (2010).
129. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (2012) (discussing the level of the attorney’s duty
depends on whether “the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or
uncertain . . . ”).
130. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (2012).
131. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690) (“The
court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”).
132. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.01 (2011) (describing a range of punishments for crimes identified in the Texas Penal Code); see also Stacy Caplow, Governors!
Seize the Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief from Deportation,
22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293, 328 n.165 (2013) (describing the sentencing ranges produced
through the federal sentencing guidelines as a “complex matrix that examines many
factors”).
133. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.41 (2011) (classifying offenses not obtained
from a conviction under the Texas Penal Code).
134. César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, When State Courts Meet Padilla: A Concerted Effort Is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-Based Immigration
Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299, 311 (2011).
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clear.”135 However, the purpose of the Padilla colloquy should not be for
the court to advise the defendant about the immigration consequences.
The colloquy’s better purpose is to establish if the attorney has, in fact,
fulfilled that duty.
At a minimum, Padilla’s mandate requires the noncitizen defendant’s
attorney to know the following: “(1) the immigration status and criminal
history of the client; (2) immigration ramifications of a proposed plea;
(3) the client’s wishes and plans for the near future; and (4) a criminal
trial strategy to meet the client’s needs.”136 The court’s questions should
be directed to establish that the attorney has made these determinations.
Determining a noncitizen’s immigration status can be a very complex
endeavor in its own right.137 However, for Padilla purposes, the trial
court’s concern should focus on the noncitizen’s right to remain in the
country. Generally, noncitizens without legal status at the time of making
a plea have no right to remain or re-enter the country with or without a
criminal conviction.138 Even among persons without legal status who
have some cognizable claim for immigration relief, their immigration statuses are uncertain at best.139 Where the immigration consequences of

135. See State v. Favela, 311 P.3d 1213, 1222 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013), cert. granted (2013)
(holding “a court’s warning or advisement to a defendant regarding possible immigration
consequences of accepting a plea is never, by itself, sufficient to cure the prejudice that
results from ineffective assistance of counsel in that regard”); Enyong v. State, 369 S.W.3d
593, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated) (holding
general plea admonishments regarding possible immigration consequences contained in
plea paperwork were not sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s effective assistance of
counsel requirement to give correct advice where the immigration consequences are “truly
clear”).
136. Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses
Fundamental Fairness and Leaves Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC.
JUST. 31, 41 (2012); see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT §§ 1.0(e), 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
(2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publica
tions/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_
of_contents.html (outlining the basic rules of attorney-client interaction).
137. See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy
of McCollouch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 189–90 (2012) (“Determining immigration status or whether a noncitizen is deportable are complex judgments that state and
local officers untrained in the intricacies of federal immigration law are ill-suited to
make.”); Hew, supra note 136 (noting determining citizenship “can be complicated”).
138. See United States v. Aceves, Cr. No. 08-00501 SOM, 2011 WL 976706, at *5 (D.
Haw., Mar. 17, 2011) (concluding the noncitizen defendant was subject to automatic removal because he was in the country without legal status, not due to his criminal
conviction).
139. César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inapplicability to
Undocumented and Non-Immigrant Visitors, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 47, 51 (2012) (“Without
a legally cognizable ‘right to remain in the United States,’ non-immigrants and undocumented individuals are unlikely to reap any benefit from Padilla.”).
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criminal convictions are uncertain, attorneys’ constitutional obligations
are fulfilled when they advise the client about the potential adverse consequences of a guilty plea.140
Commentators have argued trial courts should either refrain or be prohibited from questioning noncitizens about immigration status on Fifth
Amendment grounds.141 This is a valid concern; however, courts accepting a guilty plea bargain have a duty to ensure the plea is entered
voluntarily and intelligently, and post-Padilla, immigration status and
consequences are an integral part of that calculus.142 In Padilla, the Supreme Court could have erased this Fifth Amendment concern by allowing a generic warning to suffice for all noncitizens. However, because
Padilla requires warnings tailored to the noncitizen’s individual situation
and offense, that status becomes a necessary part of the plea colloquy.
Noncitizen defendants with a legal right to remain in the country,
whether by lawful permanent resident or visa status, have greater protections under immigration law and a right to more specific advice regarding
immigration consequences.143 For example, Jose Padilla, in his landmark
case, was a lawful permanent resident who had resided in the country for
four decades. But for the drug conviction, Padilla had the right to remain
in the country indefinitely.144 Noncitizens in these circumstances are entitled to specific immigration advice because the consequences of criminal
conviction are “truly clear.”145

140. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (“When the law is
not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”).
141. See Altman, supra note 99, at 21 (noting “judges run the risk of compelling disclosure of privileged attorney-client communication or violating noncitizen defendants’
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination” when they inquire into a noncitizen’s
immigration status); Alice Chapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 585, 611 (2011) (“[I]t would be inappropriate, harmful, and potentially unconstitutional for trial courts to question defendants about their immigration status.”); Stephen
Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 203, 218 n.57 (2011) (concluding a court’s inquiry into the defendant’s immigration status raises Fifth Amendment concerns).
142. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1493 (2010) (suggesting pleas entered
with the advice of competent counsel are purported to be voluntary and intelligent
decisions).
143. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (2010) (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the
“mercies of incompetent counsel.”).
144. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (2010).
145. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (2010) (“[A] criminal defense attorney need do no
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was
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There are broad classes of offenses in immigration law that invoke deportation proceedings for otherwise legal noncitizens.146 These are aggravated felonies;147 crimes involving moral turpitude;148 crimes involving
child abuse;149 violations of protective orders;150 stalking-related
crimes;151 crimes involving firearm offenses;152 failure to register as a sex
offender;153 and controlled substances offenses.154 These classifications
include a broad range of state law crimes. During the plea colloquy, the
court should engage counsel in a discussion about whether the charged
offense falls into a deportable category. If so, and if the noncitizen has
legal status to otherwise remain in the country, the immigration consequence is likely clear, and the court should inquire further about the advice provided to the defendant to establish the Sixth Amendment
obligation is met and the plea entered is voluntarily and intelligently
made.
Finally, courts can inquire as to the defendant’s wishes regarding possible removal in cases in which the consequences are unclear by asking
defendants whether they would choose to accept the plea if the conviction would result in certain deportation. Where a noncitizen indicates on
the record a desire to remain in the country, even if subjected to greater
punishment, the need for correct immigration advice to avoid prejudice is
greater. On the other hand, an immigrant who expresses a choice for
lesser punishment, even in the face of deportation, will be unlikely to
demonstrate prejudice in any post-conviction proceeding. This question
is not necessary to demonstrate the plea is voluntarily and intelligently
made, but can be useful as a fact finding starting point if post-conviction
review is required.

here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires a court, before accepting a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendre, admonish
the defendant “that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea
of guilty or nolo contendre for the offense charged may result in deportation, the exclusion
of admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law.” Tex. Code
Crim. Pro. § 26.13 (a)(4). The Padilla holding suggests this general admonishment is unlikely to cure defective advice from defense counsel in cases where the immigration consequences to the defendant are “truly clear.”
146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012) (listing deportable offenses for legal
noncitizens).
147. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable.”).
148. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
149. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
150. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
151. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012).
153. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).
154. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
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V. CONCLUSION
Trial judges have a clear obligation to determine a guilty plea is made
voluntarily and intelligently before accepting it. After Padilla v. Kentucky, this requires close consideration of the immigration consequences
imposed by the plea and conviction. The noncitizen’s defense attorney
has the primary duty to investigate the client’s status, to negotiate the
best possible plea, and to correctly advise about any immigration consequences within Padilla’s advisory framework. Judges, as impartial arbiters, are not charged with curing any shortcomings in the attorney’s work
and giving legal advice to the defendant. However, judges may—and
should—inquire about the matter during the plea colloquy to ensure the
attorney’s work in the area was effectively done and the advice given
meets Padilla’s requirements. This inquiry will provide a record showing
the plea was voluntarily and intelligently given, guaranteeing the defendant’s rights are preserved and providing a starting point for post-conviction review.
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